Knowledge as a Commons

Education, Knowledge and the Limits of Private Property — a Transdisciplinary Full Work

Thomas Schüller · Syntagma Forschung · Vienna ORCID: 0009-0003-9799-6747 · Contact: forschung@tschueller.com

Work card

Suggested citation: Schüller, T. (2026): Knowledge as a Commons. Education, Knowledge and the Limits of Private Property. Syntagma Forschung, Vienna. FORSCH-PROV0416, v1.2.

Abstract

The claim that knowledge is a commons does not hold in its usual form, because it collapses four distinct goods into one. This work takes it apart and rebuilds it.

It makes three contributions. First, it separates data, information, knowledge and education as four goods with distinct rivalry and excludability profiles. This yields a division of labour among the arguments: for information and codified knowledge, private property is a legally manufactured scarcity, and the non-rivalry argument carries the case. For education, commons status is a normative claim that must rest on human rights, externalities and fairness in social reproduction, because tutoring time is rival. Conflating the two loses the argument to the standard incentive objection.

Second, it formalises enclosure as a decoupling of risk bearer from disposal holder (ρ/δ) and proposes the risk–disposal quotient, which relates the public share of research inputs to the public share of disposal rights over outputs.

Third, it describes enclosure by absorption, a mechanism not found in the literature reviewed: in the training of large models the commons is not fenced in. It remains legally open and still loses its function, because the circuit of readership, new contributors and funding breaks.

The work carries counterpositions in their strongest form. It does not claim that intellectual property as such is unjustifiable, but that its justification is specific to the type of good and is routinely extended in practice beyond the point where it holds.

1. Question, method and limits

1.1 Question

1. For which of the four goods does “commons” hold analytically, and for which only normatively?
2. How can enclosure be measured rather than deplored?
3. Does the training of large models change the form of enclosure or only its scale?

1.2 Method

Textbook relation: synthesise, evaluate, go beyond. Each school is presented as its own proponents would state it, and only then confronted with the hardest available scholarly critique. Comparative material is tabulated. For every statistic the publisher, funder and stake are named, because in this field almost every number is produced by a party with a preferred result.

The biological and evolutionary strand is carried explicitly and bounded explicitly (Part 7).

1.3 Limits of this version

The two novelty claims (four-goods decomposition, absorption) rest on targeted but non-exhaustive searching. Negative findings of this kind are always defeasible; a counter-check in Scopus and Web of Science is outstanding. Several 2026 figures come from trade press with primary reference and are marked [secondary]. Page numbers and DOIs of the classics must be verified individually before print. Pending proceedings are marked as pending.

2. Part I — Four goods, not one

2.1 The category error

Since Samuelson (1954), goods theory has distinguished rivalry from excludability. Arrow (1962) derived from this the paradox that still frames the debate: optimal use requires a price of zero, production requires appropriation. Romer (1990) makes non-rivalry the engine of growth and accepts monopoly rent as its price.

Everyday talk of knowledge as a commons skips this distinction. It treats a measurement campaign, a journal article, what a person understands, and a training place as the same thing. They are not.

2.2 The decomposition

The resulting division of labour:

2.3 Why knowledge is not a transferable object

The cognitive evidence supports the categorical reading. Bartlett (1932) shows remembering as reconstruction rather than retrieval of a stored copy. Piaget and von Glasersfeld describe knowledge as the subject’s own construction. Roediger and Karpicke (2006) show that retrieval itself alters what is remembered. Knowledge is therefore not transferred but formed anew in the recipient. The property metaphor never touches knowledge, only its fixation.

A distinction the work must carry: this finding is epistemological, not pedagogical. Kirschner, Sweller and Clark (2006) show that minimally guided constructivist teaching underperforms direct instruction for novices. Phillips (1995) insists on separating the two levels. The work rests its category argument on the uncontested cognitive finding, not on the contested pedagogy.

2.4 Positioning the contribution

The DIKW hierarchy (Ackoff 1989; Rowley 2007) orders data, information and knowledge as epistemic stages, not as goods. Hess and Ostrom (2007) adopt that threefold division for commons analysis. Jones and Tonetti (2020) treat data as an economic good. Cowan, David and Foray (2000) show that non-rivalry holds fully only for codified knowledge, while tacit knowledge is effectively rival. Education is handled in isolation in education economics, as a merit good (Musgrave 1959) or as an investment (Part 3).

No work in the literature reviewed places all four categories side by side as goods with distinct profiles and derives the division of labour among arguments from that. This is the first contribution of this work.

3. Part II — The positions, each in its strongest form

This part is deliberately non-partisan. A position that appears only as its opponents state it has not been refuted, only unheard.

3.1 Liberal, neoclassical and institutional lines

On the tragedy of the commons: Hardin (1968) is routinely cited as refuted. More precisely, he is bounded. Feeny, Berkes, McCay and Acheson (1990) show he conflated a regulated commons with open access. Hardin himself corrected to “unmanaged commons” in 1998. Declaring him simply finished repeats his error with the sign reversed.

3.2 Critical political economy

3.3 Commons, free software, anarchism

Kropotkin (1902) sets mutual aid against the competition reading of evolution. Stallman (1985) turns this into a legal technique: copyleft uses copyright against enclosure. Benkler (2002, 2006) describes commons-based peer production as a third mode alongside market and hierarchy. Lessig (2004) and Creative Commons supply the licensing instruments; Bollier and Bauwens the movement perspective.

The hardest critique comes from within and is called the paradox of open: open resources are disproportionately exploited by capital-rich actors who return nothing. Halfaker et al. (2013) further show that Wikipedia’s own thickening of rules deters newcomers — commons also fail from the inside, not only through enclosure.

3.4 Theory of education and of science

3.5 Postcolonial and feminist critique

Spivak (1988), Mignolo (2011) and Santos (2014) show that the question is not only who has access to knowledge, but whose knowledge counts as knowledge. Shiva (1997) documents biopiracy, ’t Hoen (2009) the effect of TRIPS on access to medicines.

Counter-critique the work carries: Agrawal (1995) warns against essentialising “traditional knowledge”; protective rights over it reproduce the property logic they are meant to resist. Attaran (2004) shows that only a small share of essential medicines is patented in poor countries at all — the barrier there is often procurement and infrastructure, not the patent.

Feminist economics (Folbre 1994, 2001; Federici 2012) makes visible that knowledge transmission rests on unpaid care work. The link to IP theory remains thin (Halbert 2006) and is an open flank this work names but does not close.

4. Part III — How the scarcity is made in law

4.1 Case law on model training

Finding: courts assess the manner of acquisition and memorisation. The functional devaluation of the commons, the subject of Part 8, has not been at issue in any proceeding so far.

5. Part IV — Evidence

5.1 The publishing market

The barrier has not disappeared but moved: from the reading side to the publishing side. The counterposition to be stated: for readers in the Global South the shift is a net gain, since reading access becomes free.

In 2026 cOAlition S ended support for transformative arrangements and reoriented towards diamond open access, preprints and publish-review-curate. Participants concede that Plan S channelled publishing towards APCs.

5.2 Sci-Hub as a natural experiment

Bohannon (2016) documents 28 million downloads in six months, with a substantial share from high-income countries — an indication that even licensed institutions find legitimate access too cumbersome. Himmelstein et al. (2018) put coverage at 85 per cent of closed-access literature. Correa et al. (2022) find a 1.72-fold higher citation rate for downloaded articles; the finding is correlational and based on twelve journals.

The second bypass of the market is legal and is called the preprint. Fraser et al. (2021) describe preprints as the main channel of pandemic research. Brierley et al. (2022) find little change in core claims between preprint and peer-reviewed version. The risk lies less in science than in public reception of unreviewed findings; publish-review-curate models are the answer to that.

5.3 Access to education, with Austria as the test case

The Austrian finding is central to this work. A country with open admission and no substantial tuition still shows an origin factor of roughly 2.5. Freedom from price is a necessary, not a sufficient condition. Anyone demanding education as a commons must say so, or they promise what their own test case does not deliver.

The Austrian school-book scheme shows the same pattern from the other side: it funds free access to proprietary works. That is state-paid access, not a commons; the stock stays closed.

5.4 Open educational resources

Hilton (2016, 2020), Colvard et al. (2018) and Clinton and Khan (2019) find equal learning outcomes at lower cost and sometimes lower withdrawal rates. The caveat to state: a substantial share of these studies comes from teams close to the OER movement.

5.5 Patents and access

The evidence is split and stays split. Mansfield (1986) and Galasso and Schankerman (2015) support the incentive effect, at least sector-specifically. Moser (2013), Williams (2013) and Boldrin and Levine (2013) show redirection rather than increase. Shapiro (2001) describes patent thickets. Beall and Kuhn (2012) document 24 compulsory-licence episodes between 1995 and 2011, mostly with price reductions. A blanket answer to whether patents promote innovation is not defensible on this record; the answer is sector-specific, and pharmaceuticals are the exception, not the rule.

6. Part V — The risk–disposal asymmetry

6.1 The pattern

Enclosure of knowledge can be described as a recurring decoupling: whoever bears the risk and cost (ρ) is not whoever disposes of the result (δ).

The pattern is the domain instance of master theorem FORSCH-0083.

6.2 The risk–disposal quotient

A proposed measure:

RDQ = (public share of R&D inputs) / (public share of disposal rights over outputs)

An RDQ of 1 means congruence. Values well above 1 indicate that publicly borne risk passes into private disposal. The quotient is a metric, not a verdict; whether a deviation is justified is a separate question, because private follow-on investment is real.

Data sources for the numerator: the PatentsView government interest field, NIH iEdison, the Crossref Funder Registry, OpenAlex, CORDIS, PATSTAT, and the patent-to-science linkage of Marx and Fuegi (2020); for Austria the FWF project database, the knowledge balance sheets under §13 UG, and aws.

Empirical anchors:

6.3 Positioning and critique

Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013) describe the same pattern as the risk–reward nexus but remain conceptual. No formal model of the decoupling for knowledge goods was found; the RDQ is the second contribution of this work.

The critique of Mazzucato must be carried: Karlson, Sandström and Wennberg (2021) object to selection bias, absent counterfactuals, and the conflation of basic funding with entrepreneurship. The RDQ is partly immune to this because it measures a ratio and asserts no causality. It also does not measure who bears the risk of late-stage failure; that gap is disclosed here.

7. Part VI — The evolutionary and cognitive substrate

Passing on information without loss to the giver is not a product of law. It is older than any legal order.

Where the analogy holds and where it does not:

The strand is therefore heuristic, not foundational. The Sperber line supports the core argument of this work better than the gene-transfer analogy does.

8. Part VII — Enclosure by absorption

8.1 The three forms

8.2 Terminology

The term “third enclosure” is already taken, and in each case with a different mechanism.

None of them describes the case meant here: a commons that nobody closes and that nonetheless loses its function. The work therefore claims the mechanism, not the term.

8.3 The mechanism

A knowledge commons lives not on its stock but on its circuit: readership produces contributors, contributors produce stock, visibility produces funding. A model that absorbs the stock and delivers the answer without the detour removes readership from the circuit. The stock remains free under its licence. The inflow does not.

What is rival here is not knowledge but attention and infrastructure. This is where the four-goods decomposition of Part 2 pays: the non-rivalry of information was never a statement about the rivalry of its carrying structures.

8.4 What the models are trained on

The corpora are documented, and they consist in large part of the commons.

This supports the mechanism from two sides. The commons is demonstrably the raw material, and it is under-represented in the open successor corpora — being openly licensed is not enough to stay visible in this chain of use.

8.5 Evidence

The record is therefore not uniform. Stack Overflow was already declining before 2022, and the Wikipedia findings partly contradict one another. The work accordingly claims a mechanism with evidenced components, not a closed causal chain.

8.6 Licensing and return flow

Parts of the market are already answering the question in private law, before the law has answered it.

The common feature: payment is for access and for the past. The reproduction circuit of the commons — readership, contributors, newcomers — is not restored by it. One counterposition deserves naming: as long as terms are transparent, pricing is not enclosure but the minimum condition of reciprocity.

8.7 Why licences do not reach this

The legal technique of the free software movement — copyleft, share-alike — presupposes that the use is copyright-relevant, so the licence may impose conditions. If training is classified as an exception, no licence condition applies, because the exception displaces the licence. That is the legal core of absorption: the commons is not closed; its protective mechanism is bypassed.

The counterposition in its strongest form: a remuneration duty for training favours capital-rich licensees and disadvantages open and academic models; the European Copyright Society warns accordingly in its opinion on C-250/25. Protecting the commons with the wrong instrument may hand it to the largest providers for good.

9. Part VIII — Ordering options with a price tag

No option without costs and without the condition under which it fails.

Position of the work: the most robust instruments are those that decouple funding from disposal without creating new exclusion — diamond open access, upfront funding with disclosure obligations, rights retention. Absorption cannot be addressed by licence and only by regulation: transparency duties on training content, a remuneration duty for commercial use under an exception, or infrastructure levies in favour of the stocks drawn upon. Each of these carries the side effect named in 8.5, and whoever demands them should say so.

10. Conclusion

1. “Knowledge is a commons” is a factual statement about non-rivalry for information and codified knowledge, and a normative claim for education. Only the separation makes both defensible.
2. Enclosure is measurable as a decoupling of risk and disposal. The RDQ turns a stance into a metric.
3. With the training of large models a form of enclosure appears that needs no fence. Law and licensing practice do not yet reach it.
4. The Austrian finding keeps the work honest: freedom from fees alone does not produce equal access.

11. References

The list below names the works used in the text. It is identical in both language versions, since the apparatus itself is language-neutral. Citations and DOIs are to be verified individually before print; the machine-readable form is supplied as daten/…_literatur.bib.

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Additions made in version v1.1

Additions to the alphabetical list above; they concern Part 8 above all.

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Licence: CC BY 4.0. Attribution: Thomas Schüller, Syntagma Forschung, Vienna. This is the passive version for deposit and verification; the computing version of the RDQ tool runs on the platform.